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ABSTRACT
The separation of a company from its members, based on legal
personality, is recognized as one of the fundamental principles of
corporate law. It expresses the legal distinction between the two entities. A consequence of the separateness principle is that members
are not liable for the debts of their companies, and companies cannot be held liable for the debts of their members. However, such
consequences of the principle of mutual autonomy of companies and
their members are in sharp contrast with commercial reality, in
which intertwined corporate groups operate as a single economic
entity. In market transactions, a subsidiary often becomes a tool in
the hands of its controlling partner—the parent company—trading
on its own behalf but in the interest of the parent enterprise or the
entire corporate group. Consequently, the subsidiary rather than the
 Professor, University of Silesia. This contribution was written in the
framework of the Research Project 2020/39/B/HS5/02631, funded by the National
Science Centre in Poland.
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controlling company is liable to third parties when harm is caused
to them. In such situations, the application of the principle of corporate separateness gives rise to an unjustified privilege to the parent company—the member of the subsidiary—while parties contracting with the subsidiary are at risk. Many legal systems react by
mitigating the separateness principle, using devices such as as
“piercing (lifting) the corporate veil,” “disregarding (avoiding)
corporate identity,” “intrusion beyond the barrier” (Durchgriff) or
“de facto management” (gestion de fait). The purpose of this study
is to present the terms and preconditions of different veil-piercing
liability mechanisms in selected jurisdictions such as Poland, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, and the United States. The need
to analyse the construction of veil-piercing liability in the Italian
and Polish legal systems is a consequence of discussion on the methods of protection available to creditors of a limited liability company.
Keywords: Poland, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, United States,
piercing (lifting) the corporate veil, disregarding (avoiding) corporate identity, intrusion beyond the barrier, capital companies, subsidiary, parent company, protection of company creditors, commercial law
I. INTRODUCTION
The separation of a company from its members based on legal
personality1 is recognized as one of the fundamental principles of
corporate law. It is expressed in terms of the legal distinctiveness
between the two2 and extends to include corporate group operations
in which a parent company is the controlling member of a subsidiary. The parent/dependence relationship in this regard does not serve
to lift the principle of separation. While not expressly stated in
Polish law, the principle is inferred from the construction of the legal
personality of group members.
In the present paper, it is argued that discussions on reforming
the capital structure of the limited liability company have exposed
1. See M. Pazdan, in 1 KODEKS CYWILNY. KSIĘGA DRUGA. WŁASNOŚĆ I INNE
PRAWA RZECZOWE. KOMENTARZ 139 (K. Pietrzykowski ed., C.H. Beck 2013).

2. In Polish literature, see, e.g., J. Frąckowiak, Podmioty stosunków cywilnoprawnych – Zagadnienia ogólne, in 1 SYSTEM PRAWA PRYWATNEGO, CZĘŚĆ
OGÓLNA 1016 (M. Safjan ed., C.H. Beck 2007).
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deficiencies in protecting the creditors of such companies. These
shortcomings may be removed by strengthening the protection of
creditors and including the company’s shareholders in the group of
entities that are liable towards the creditors. This does not preclude
the development of other protective instruments such as the motion
of liability of management-board members. In the context of the
above, the present research utilizes as its basic method the comparative method of analysis.
The purpose of this study is to present the terms and preconditions of different veil-piercing liability mechanisms in selected jurisdictions, that is in Polish, German, Swiss, Austrian, Italian, and
American laws. The American system is the departure point and the
adopted benchmark. The choice of the United States stems from the
fact that it was the first jurisdiction to identify and address the abuse
of corporate identity.3 Currently, the notion of veil-piercing liability
seems to most widespread in the US where most of the judgements
regarding this matter are issued. German legislation and doctrine
provide the most comprehensive conceptualization of veil-piercing
liability. Austrian and Swiss legislations, benefitting from the legacy of German literature, introduce certain distinctions in the understanding of veil-piercing liability. As to Italy, it is one of the few
European countries where substantive law provides for a special
mechanism of the dominating company’s private law liability towards the creditors of the daughter companies. The need to analyse
the doctrine of veil-piercing liability in the Polish legal system is a
consequence of a discussion of the means of protection available to
the creditors of a limited liability company.4 German law having introduced and developed the notion of veil-piercing liability in the
context of a civil-law jurisdiction, it may also be adopted in Polish
law, another continental legal system.
3. R. SZCZEPANIAK, NADUŻYCIE PRAWA DO POSŁUGIWANIA SIĘ FORMĄ
PRAWNĄ OSOBY PRAWNEJ 20 (TNOIK 2009); BELLAMY & CHILD: EUROPEAN UNION LAW OF COMPETITION (D. Bailey & L. E. John eds., Oxford U. Press 2014);
B. Cortese, Piercing the Corporate Veil in EU Competition Law: The Parent Subsidiary Relationship and Antitrust Liability, in EU COMPETITION LAW. BETWEEN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT ch. 4 (B. Cortese ed., Wolters Kluwer 2013);
S. Demeyere, Liability of Mother Company for Its Subsidiary in French, Belgian
and English Law, 23 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 385 (2015).
4. Judgements of the Supreme Court, September 18, 2014, III PK 136/13,
OSNP 2016, no. 2, item 17; March 17, 2015, I PK 179/14, OSNP 2016, no. 11,
item 140; Court of Appeal, February 7, 2007, I ACa 1033/06.
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The objective of the current paper is thus to discuss the notion
of veil piercing liability in selected countries in order to analyze the
existing legal solutions. This will allow for assessment of the effects
of adopting particular legal solutions and the advantages, as well as
difficulties that selected jurisdictions face when tackling the difficult
issue of veil-piercing liability.
In broad terms, the essence of separating the two entities is that
members are not liable for the debts of their companies, and companies cannot be held liable for the debts of their members. 5 A company’s assets are to satisfy the claims of its creditors, who may not
seek redress from the company’s members,6 regardless of the impact
they may have on the company’s operation.
However, the aforementioned consequence of the principle of
mutual autonomy of companies and their members is in sharp contrast with commercial reality, in which corporate groups operate as
a single economic entity, regardless of the existence of parent and
daughter companies. In market transactions, a subsidiary often becomes a tool in the hands of its controlling partner—the parent company—acting in commercial reality on its own behalf but in the economic interest of the parent enterprise or the entire corporate group.7
The consequence of such acts is the emergence of the subsidiary’s
liability to third parties when harm is caused to them. In such situations—as it is claimed—the application of the principle of corporate
separateness gives rise to an unjustified privilege to the benefit of
the parent company—the member of the subsidiary8—while placing
those who contract with the subsidiary in a risky position. Incidents
of a parent company’s control over a subsidiary company that lead
to harm being caused to the subsidiary and its creditors are not uncommon. Typically, this results from managerial and/or financial restrictions imposed by the parent company which, in a worst-case
scenario, can bring the subsidiary to a position where it can no
5. Arts. 151 § 4 & 301 § 5, Code of Commercial Partnerships and Companies; Act of September 15, 2000, Code of Commercial Partnerships and Companies (CCPC), Dz.U. no. 94, poz. 1037, as amended.
6. Frąckowiak, supra note 2.
7. A. Szumański, Spór wokół roli interesu grupy spółek i jego relacji w
szczególności do interesu własnego spółki uczestniczącej w grupie, 9 PRZEGLĄD
PRAWA HANDLOWEGO 9 (2010).
8. A. OPALSKI, PRAWO ZGRUPOWAŃ SPÓŁEK 476 (C.H. Beck 2012).
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longer satisfy its debts. This raises the following question: when this
occurs, why not shifting the liability of the subsidiary to the parent
company? It should be liable for the damage sustained by the subsidiary or directly liable towards parties injured by the by acts of the
subsidiary for which the parent company was ultimately responsible.
Many legal systems are making such a move, primarily in the
jurisprudence of their courts,9 by mitigating the separateness principle with various legal constructions referred to, in most general
terms, as “piercing (lifting) the corporate veil,” “disregarding
(avoiding) corporate identity,” “intrusion beyond the barrier”
(Durchgriff) or “de facto management” (gestion de fait).
The theory of separateness of companies from their members is
recognized in German legislation. § 13(2) of the Limited Liability
Companies Act (GmbHG)10 introduces the principle of corporate
separateness, which means that members are not liable for the company’s debts (Trennungsprinzip).11 As in the Polish legal system,
corporations are independent entities and constitute legal subjects
separate from their members. The separateness of a company from
its members is the case not only in corporate relationships but also
in non-corporate relationships, in which members act with the company as equal parties to civil law relationships, entering into contracts with the company.
In the face of incompatibility of the corporate separateness theory with the economic reality in which commercial companies operate, German, Austrian and Swiss legal systems permit its mitigation by adopting the theory of veil-piercing liability (Durchgrijfshaftung) and, in consequence, exclusion of the principle of members’ limited responsibility for the company’s liabilities. Although
in German doctrine there is no independent and homogenous legal
construction of veil-piercing liability, such liability must be identified with the liability of a member of a company under specific legal
9. A. Szumański, Regulacja prawna holdingu w polskim i europejskim
prawie spółek (zagadnienia pojęciowe), 8 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA HANDLOWEGO
(1996).
10. Gesetz betreffend die Gesellchaften mit beschränkter Haftung, April 20,
1892 (BGB1. I S. 2586).
11. M. LUTTER & P. HOMMELHOFF, GMBH-GESETZ: KOMMENTARHON 142
(14th ed., Otto Schmidt 1995).
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provisions or in a situation of a member’s accession to debt.12 The
purpose of the liability is to set aside or mitigate the principle of
separateness.13 Italian law also provides for restrictions on the principle of legal separateness by affording legal protection to parties
contracting with subsidiary companies. Finally, veil-piercing liability is also associated with the English concept of piercing (lifting)
the corporate veil, drawn from the terminology adopted in American
law.14
In contrast, Polish legislation does not envisage any construction
allowing to limit or mitigate the principle of corporate separateness.
Despite the heterogeneity of the concept and vague boundaries of
piercing liability, there have been many attempts to define the notion
in Polish academic literature. Certain authors indicate that it is an
exception to the principle under which company members incur no
personal liability for the company’s debts, implying “either suppression of the separation principle or, possibly, only of the limited liability principle.”15 Other scholars define it as avoidance or mitigation of the legal separateness of corporations, leading to an attribution of certain legal norms, contractual provisions or liability to another entity,16 or more broadly, as a legal instrument intended to afford protection to the company’s creditors or creditors of a subsidiary. This protection may serve as a basis to disregard the legal personality of a given company, to avoid the separateness of several
companies with capital connections and treat them as a single economic entity, or even to question specific transactions or contracts
concluded between a member and the company.17 It is also indicated
in the literature that the theory involves the direct accountability of
12. O. Sztejnert, Odpowiedzialność przebijająca" i przesłanki jej stosowania
w niemieckim prawie handlowym, PALESTRA 41/9-10 (477-478), 124 (1997).
13. W. Popiołek, Odpowiedzialność spółki dominującej za szkodę
“pośrednią” wyrządzoną przez spółkę zależną, in ROZPRAWY Z PRAWA
PRYWATNEGO ORAZ NOTARIALNEGO. KSIĘGA PAMIĄTKOWA DEDYKOWANA
PROFESOROWI MAKSYMILIANOWI PAZDANOWI 306 (A. Dańko-Roesler, A.
Oleszko & R. Pastuszko eds., 2014).
14. M. Zmysłowska, Odpowiedzialność przebijająca w prawie
amerykańskim i włoskim, IWS 1 (2017).
15. T. TARGOSZ, NADUŻYCIE OSOBOWOŚCI PRAWNEJ 138 (Kraków
Zakamycze 2004).
16. A. Opalski, Problematyka pominięcia prawnej odrębności spółek
kapitałowych, 8 PPH 10 (2012).
17. Zmysłowska, supra note 14, at 2.
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members for the company’s debts by avoiding two principles: legal
separateness of a company from its members and liability of members for the company’s debts.18
II. PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CORPORATE SEPARATENESS
Under the Polish legal system, both partnerships and companies
are characterized by legal separateness from their members. Partnerships were given legal subjectivity by the legislator, which means
the capacity to be a subject of rights and obligations and, consequently, the capacity to incur such rights and obligations (Art. 8 of
the Code of Commercial Partnerships and Companies (CCPC). In
the same way, beside natural and legal persons, the legislator introduced a third category of subjects,19 the so-called imperfect legal
persons, statutory subjects or non-personal subjects.20 As a result,
partnerships have no legal personality as such and enjoy legal subjectivity only insofar as legal provisions afford them legal capacity.
Thus, affording legal personality to partnerships implies their organizational and legal separation from the members who formed them.21
As opposed to partnerships, companies were afforded legal personality, which means that they obtained the most extensive attributes of personality.22 A company acts through its governing bodies,
its members are not liable for its debts (subject to Art. 13 § 2 CCPC),
and benefits transferred from the company’s assets to its members
require a legal basis in the form of a statutory provision or company
action. In addition, there exists a special corporate relationship between the company and its members.23

18. M. Wiórek, Kilka uwag o teorii nadużycia prawa jako koncepcji
uzasadniającej tzw. odpowiedzialność przebijającą, in WPŁYW EUROPEIZACJI
PRAWA NA INSTYTUCJE PRAWA HANDLOWEGO 237 (J. Kruczalak-Jankowska ed.,
LexisNexis 2013).
19. See W.J. Katner, Podwójna czy potrójna podmiotowość w prawie
cywilnym?, in ROZPRAWY PRAWNICZE. KSIĘGA PAMIĄTKOWA PROFESORA
MAKSYMILIANA PAZDAN 1031 (Kraków Zakamycze 2005).
20. Regarding terminology, see also M. WACH, STATUS UŁOMNYCH OSÓB
PRAWNYCH W POLSKIM PRAWIE CYWILNYM 89 (Warszawa 2008); M. TARSKA,
SPÓŁKA Z O.O. ISTOTA. USTRÓJ. FUNKCJONOWANIE 145 (Warszawa 2003); J.
Frąckowiak, in SYSTEM PRAWA PRYWATNEGO. TOM I. PRAWO CYWILNE – CZĘŚĆ
OGÓLNA 1202 (M. Safjan ed., Warszawa 2012).
21. See IV CK 13/03 Supreme Court, July 8, 2003, Legalis no. 61171.
22. Opalski, supra note 16, at 10.
23. Id.
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Corporate separateness (Trennungsprinzip) performs an important function in the German legal system. The legal personality
of joint-stock companies stems from the provision of the first sentence of § 1(1) AktG,24 and in the case of limited liability companies,
it is defined in the provision of § 13(1) GmbHG, under which a company so incorporated independently exercises its own rights and obligations.25 This refers both to corporate and non-corporate relationships, in which members act with the company as equal contracting
parties.26 The legal personality granted, also means that the claims
of creditors can only satisfied from the company’s assets.27
As in German law, Austrian legislation grants legal personality
to limited liability companies28 and joint-stock companies29 which,
in turn, allows to adopt the legal principle of separateness of a company from its members (§ 61(2) öGmbHG30 in the case of limited
liability companies and § 8 öAktG31 in that of joint-stock companies). In the United States32 and in the Italian Republic,33 the attribution of legal personality to companies gave rise to development of
the concept of veil-piercing liability.
In Poland, under the principle of non-liability of members for
their company’s debts (Art. 151 § 4 CCPC and Art. 301 § 5 CCPC),
which accompanies the principle of corporate separateness, companies are independently liable for their own debts, and their creditors
may not seek satisfaction from the personal assets of their

24. Aktiengesetz v.
06.09.1965, (BGB1. I 1965 p. 1089),
https://perma.cc/27C3-XQQS (Last accessed: June 30, 2022).
25. A. Krawczyk, Przebicie przez przypisanie w koncernie, 1 Przegląd
Prawa Handlowego 34 (2016).
26. See LUTTER & HOMMELHOFF, supra note 11 at 142.
27. The German legislator excluded the possibility to assert claims for a
company’s debts directly against its shareholders (§ 13(2) GmbHG), which also
refers to stockholders of joint stock companies (sentence 2 of § 1(1) AktG).
28. § 61(1) öGmbHG.
29. § 1 öAktG.
30. Österreichisches Strafgesetzbuch (Budesgesetz v. January 23, 1974 über
die mit gerichtlicher Strafe bedrohten Handlungen; BGBI. Nr. 60),
https://perma.cc/8ZRH-KRDQ (Last accessed: June 30, 2022).
31. Österreichisches
Aktiengesetz
(ÖBGBI.
S.
98)
(CHB)
https://perma.cc/A4H9-9CBU (Last accessed: June 30, 2022).
32. W. M. FLETCHER, 1 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 334 § 41.77 (2015).
33. See also P. Moskała, Konstrukcja odpowiedzialności cywilnoprawnej we
włoskim prawie grup spółek, in 1 STUDIA PRAWA PRYWATNEGO 32 (2016).

2021-2022]

VEIL-PIERCING LIABILITY

109

members.34 Authors are divided as to whether the exclusion of personal liability of company members for its debts constitutes a characteristic of corporations or whether it is a natural consequence of
such entities being vested with legal personality.35 The majority
view is that the first opinion should prevail, i.e. that it represents a
corporate characteristic.36
The principle of legal separateness seems a natural solution that
best suits the interests of companies. By contrast, in German law,
the general rule is that corporate members incur personal and unlimited liability, and its mitigation or exclusion constitutes an exception
to that rule.37 As a result, only the combination of the principle of
separateness and the liability incurred by members of a company
permits the conclusion that in civil law the general rule is personal
liability of members, or their solidary liability, even though such
persons are not parties to legal relationships.
The assumption of full separation between the actions and assets
of a company and its members serves as basis for the legislative regimes in Swiss law (Trennung zwischen dem Rechtsträger und seine
Mitgliedern),38 American law39 and Italian law.40
The arguments for excluding corporate members from liability
include: encouraging initiative, promoting creativity and achieving
greater objectivity in decision making processes; all attributes that
lead to optimizing an undertaking’s economic growth.41 Conversely, not just the economic growth but also the efficiency of an
undertaking can suffer when the actions and decisions of members

34. See VI ACa 1561/14, Legalis No. 1392962, Court of Appeal of Warsaw,
October 23, 2015; I ACa 854/14, Court of Appeal of Białystok, March 5, 2015; V
CK 411/02, Supreme Court, October 23, 2003, MONITOR PRAWNICZY no. 9, 2004,
at 417.
35. Opalski, supra note 16, at 11.
36. A. Szajkowski & M. Tarska, in 2 KODEKS SPÓŁEK HANDLOWYCH.
KOMENTARZ DO ARTYKUŁÓW 151-300 Art. 151, no. 65 (P. Sołtysiński ed., C.H.
Beck 2014).
37. T. Raiser, Die Haftungsbeschränkung ist kein Wesensmerkmal der
juristischen Person, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR MARCUS LUTTER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG.
DEUTSCHES UND EUROPÄISCHES GESELLSCHAFTS-, KONZERN- UND
KAPITALMARKTRECHT 637 (U.H. Schneider 2000).
38. A. BINDER, T. GEISER & V. ROBERTO, EINFÜHRUNG INS PRIVATRECHT.
OBLIGATIONENRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEIL, OBLIGATIONENRECT BESONDERER
TEIL, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 15 (U. St. Gallen 2008).
39. FLETCHER, supra note 32, at 334.
40. See also Moskała supra note 33, at 32.
41. Raiser, supra note 37, at 649.
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are influenced solely by the potential risk to their personal assets
should the business fail.42 Notwithstanding, it has to be acknowledged that corporate separateness effectively shifts the liability and
risk of a company’s insolvency to its creditors.
However, the concept of veil-piercing liability must not be regarded as depriving members of a company of the privilege of exclusion of their liability or even as a rule. Such liability is just one
of the aspects involved in the subject of “piercing.”
III. VEIL-PIERCING LIABILITY
A. Characteristics of Veil-Piercing Liability
1. Germany
In German law, the term “veil-piercing liability” has no legal
definition. Sharing the opinion expressed in legal doctrine, the concept may refer to situations in which members incur personal, unlimited, solidary liability for the company’s debts towards its creditors.43 Following the broadest of the definitions proposed in the literature, it should be indicated that, in such situations, the liability
regime under § 13(2) GmbHG is stricken out, resulting in the external liability of members towards the company’s creditors or materialization of the obligation to reimburse to the company, as a part of
the internal relationship, all losses suffered by the latter. The point
is to afford to the company’s creditors a possibility of indirect satisfaction of their claims.44 The cited definition is valuable inasmuch
as it accounts for both external and internal liability of company
members. However, its drawbacks also need to be recognized. It
does not account for the legal nature of veil-piercing liability and

42. TARGOSZ, supra note 15, at 72 et seq., M. WIÓREK, OCHRONA WIERZYCIELI SPÓŁKI Z O.O. POPRZEZ OSOBISTĄ ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚĆ JEJ WSPÓLNIKÓW. KONCEPCJA ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚCI PRZEBIJAJĄCEJ I NADUŻYCIA FORMY PRAWNEJ
SPÓŁKI W PRAWIE POLSKIM I NIEMIECKIM 272 (Wrocław 2016).
43. See K. HEIDER, MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ: AKTG,
commentary to § 1 AktG, nb. 63 (M. Habersack & W. Goette eds., C.H. Beck
2015).
44. T. Raiser, in GESETZ BETREFFEND DIE GESELLSCHAFTEN MIT
BESCHRÄNKTER HAFTUNG (GMBHG). GROßKOMMENTAR. BAND I. EINLEITUNG §§
1 BIS 28, § 13, nb 52 (P. Ulmer, M. Habersack & M. Winter eds., Mohr Siebeck
2005).
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does not specify the legal basis for the company’s claims against its
members. Finally, it does not take into consideration other situations
that might arise.
In German law, veil-piercing liability does not cover situations
in which members are liable towards the company’s creditors for
delicts of their own making or when the source of their obligations
were legal acts in which they pledged to assume liability for the
company’s debts (unechte Durchgriffshaftung). At the same time,
German authors assume the existence of so-called reverse veilpiercing liability (Umgekehrter Haftungsdurchgriff), which excludes the possibility of personal creditors of a company’s members
to be satisfied from the company’s assets.45
In seeking to provide a wider characterization of veil piercing, it
needs to be understood that in German doctrine there is no independent legal construction of veil-piercing liability. Due to the various
ways in which it is possible to impose liability on company members
for the company’s debt, systematization and comparison was set
forth to address the multitude of situations presented.
In German academic literature, one can distinguish between liability piercing (namely, Durchgriffshaftung, Haftungsdurchgriff)
and attributive piercing (Zurechnungsdurchgriff). The latter consists
in the application and interpretation of legal provisions or contractual clauses so that, by disregarding the separateness of entities, the
consequences of certain events are attributed to a specific entity.46
Attribution may proceed in two directions, meaning attribution of
the company’s actions to a member and the other way round. Along
these lines, authors distinguish various types of “piercing,” namely
the type where the member is charged, the other type with the company being charged and two other types: to the benefit of the member or to the benefit of the company.47
Shortcomings of the proposed definition have been identified in
the literature on the subject. Authors distinguish between proper
(echte Durchgriffslehren) and improper veil-piercing liability. The
first of the two relates to the principle of separateness and gives rise
to the external liability of members of a limited liability company
45.
46.
47.

HEIDER, supra note 43 at commentary to § 1 AktG, no. 63.
TARGOSZ, supra note 15, at 138.
K. SCHMIDT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 221(4th ed., Heymanns 2002).
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for the company’s debts, which is effective directly to the company’s creditors and based on company law.48 In the same way, such
theories question the legal independence of companies, and their attribution with the feature of legal personality. It is assumed that such
liability is legitimate only in situations involving violation of obligations which are intended to afford protection both to the company
or its members and to the company’s creditors.49 Among theories of
proper piercing liabilities, one should point to the subjective (subjektive Mißbrauchslehre) and objective theory of abuse, as well as the
institutional theory and theory of the norm’s purpose (classical
norm’s purpose theory).
On the other hand, improper veil-piercing liability (improper
piercing of liability, unechter Haftungsdurchgriff) is the case when
the liability of members of a limited liability company towards its
creditors, is based on the general regime of liability envisaged in
civil law, thus outside company law, and principally moulded as external liability.50 Other authors indicate that improper veil-piercing
liability also covers situations of internal liability towards the company and those in which member liability is grounded in company
law.51
In German literature, veil-piercing liability is substantiated by
the following theories: abuse theory (Mißbrauchslehren), institutional theories (institutionelle Lehren) and norm application theories
(Normanwendungslehren).52
According to the abuse theory, veil-piercing liability may apply
in situations of abuse of the corporate form (subjective theory).53
This concept is based on the assumption that the exploitation of corporate separateness by a member in any way that is contrary to its
purpose and use, may result in such member being held liable for
the company’s debts, regardless of whether or not he acted with intent to injure creditors or circumvent the law. Since proponents of

48. Raiser, supra note 44 at § 13, no. 54.
49. Id.
50. Id., § 13, no. 90.
51. G. Bitter, in SCHOLZ. KOMMENTAR ZUM GMBH-GESETZ § 13, nb. 90
(11th ed., Otto Schmidt 2012).
52. SCHMIDT, supra note 47, at 221.
53. TARGOSZ, supra note 15, at 122.
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this concept invoke the construction and function of a company as a
corporation, an independent legal subject, objective abuse of the
corporate form is also referred to as the “institutional theory.”
On the other hand, the alternative concept54 focuses on the purpose and role of provisions which, by restricting a member’s liability for company debts, affords that member a liability privilege
(Haftungsprivileg). The analysis of purpose of such norm, considering the circumstances of a specific matter, allows establishing if the
given norm is applicable or if it should be disregarded.55 This theory
had an important influence on the shape of the contemporary socalled teleological reduction56 of legal provisions setting out limited
liability of the members for their company’s debts. This notion is
based on the presumption that the limitation of members’ liability is
not a characteristic of a corporate body but rather a consequence of
a legislative choice. Therefore, only fulfilment of the appropriate
preconditions and minimum conditions allows for the exclusion of
members’ liability for the company’s debts and, where such conditions are not complied with, a member will incur personal and unlimited liability.57
The criterion for another division of the piercing theory is either
reference to the principle of corporate separateness or development
of veil-piercing liability in isolation from that principle. Theories
invoking the principle of separateness render veil-piercing liability
as opposing that principle and put emphasis on independence and
separateness of members and their assets from the company. From
this point of view, theories involving the principle of separateness
include both abuse theories and institutional theories.58

54. W. Müller-Freienfels, Zur Lehre vom sogenannten “Durchgriff” bei
juristischen Personen im Privatrecht: Rechtsform und Realität juristischer
Personen. Ein rechts-vergleichender Beitrag zur Frage des Durchgriffs auf die
Personen oder Gegenstände hinter der juristischen Person by Rolf Serick, 156
ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 522 (1958).
55. See also T. Fock, commentary to § 1 AktG, in AKTIENGESETZ no. 45 (G.
Spindler & E. Stilz eds., Munich 2015).
56. M. Grochowski, Reguła de minimis non curat praetor w prawie
prywatnym, in SINE IRA ET STUDIO. KSIĘGA JUBILEUSZOWA DEDYKOWANA
SĘDZIEMU JACKOWI GUDOWSKIEMU 882 (T. Ereciński, P. Gregorczyk & K. Weitz
eds., Wolters Kluwer Polska 2016).
57. WIÓREK, supra note 42, at 112.
58. Bitter, supra note 51 at § 13, no. 117.
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2. Switzerland and Austria
In the Swiss and Austrian legal systems, the concept of veilpiercing liability has not been so amply and comprehensively developed as in German law. Swiss legislation considers that the corporate form may be abused by members of legal persons, and therefore
provides legal solutions offering more protection to creditors.59
Austrian law provides mechanisms protecting the assets of a
company’s creditors against disloyal behaviour of its members.60
However, in fear of insufficient creditor protection, jurisprudence
allows, in exceptional cases, to derogate from the principle of separateness.61 Because of the judiciary’s significant role in the development of the concept of veil-piercing liability, such jurisprudence
lacks homogeneity and covers not only members’ liability for the
company’s debts but also their delictual liability for acts that harm
its creditors.62
In a 1983 decision, the Austrian Supreme Court held that the
concept of veil-piercing liability may not be compatible with the
Austrian legal system.63 At a later time, the concept was admitted
although its practical application remained insignificant. 64 In 1986,
the Austrian Supreme Court defined the scope of liability regarding
a member managing the company’s operations vis-a-vis the company’s creditors. This decision was delivered in a case where the
controlling member, a bank, exerted considerable influence on matters handled by a daughter company. The daughter company, with
its managers acting under the member’s instructions and guidelines,
subsequently became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy. The Supreme Court, when examining claims submitted by the creditors of
the bankrupt company against the controlling member, held that due
to the influence of the member on the controlled entity, the shareholder had a special duty of care in the exercise of its corporate
59.
60.

Binder, Geiser & Roberto, supra note 38 at 15.
F.
WÜNSCHER,
DIE
DURCHGRIFFSHAFTUNG
WEGEN
SPHÄRENVERMISCHUNG IM DEUTSCHEN UND ÖSTERREICHISCHEN GMBH-RECHT 4
(U. Graz 2014).
61. OGH June 16, 1983, 6 Ob 579/83, SZ 56/101.
62. OGH April 12, 2001, 8 ObA 98/00 w, SZ 74/65.
63. OGH June 16, 1983, supra note 61.
64. Judgements of the OGH July 14, 1986, 1 Ob 571/86, JBl 1986, 713; April
29, 2004, 6 Ob. 313/03 B, GeS 2005 no. 1.
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rights and exertion of influence on the management of the controlled
company. In consequence and without any direct reference to veilpiercing liability, it was concluded that the member of the bankrupt
company was liable for negligently driving the company towards
insolvency as per § 159 öStGB.65 In the cited ruling, the risk relating
to participation in the company was found to exceed the value of
capital invested by the member, which accounts for and points to the
ruling’s affinity with veil-piercing liability theory.
In this regard, Austrian law shows many similarities with German legislation. Just as the German legal system, it permits the use
of the interpretation method of legal norms and contractual provisions which recognizes that they relate not only to a member but
also to the company (piercing by attribution, Zurechnungsdurchgriff). The jurisprudence of the Austrian Supreme Court
offers many examples for relativization of the legal separateness of
the company and its members through piercing by attribution, including consideration of the member’s state of awareness while
evaluating if the company acted in good faith or charging the company with the consequences of breach of a contractual prohibition
of competition (namely, vertragliches Wettbewerbsverbot) binding
on the member controlling the company. Moreover, the corporate
separateness of an entity from its members may be avoided by way
of mutual attribution of their features. As a result, an error as to the
characteristics of a company’s controlling member may serve as a
basis for the avoidance of consequences of a legal agreement with
the company. Finally, as in the German legal system, the construction of piercing by attribution works in both directions as, on the one
hand, it allows to burden the company with circumstances relating
to a member and, on the other to shift to members some liability that
would otherwise be on the company.66
3. United States

65. Österreichisches Strafgesetzbuch (federal law of January 23, 1974 über
die mit gerichtlicher Strafe bedrohten Handlungen; BGBI. Nr. 60). See also OGH
July 14, 1986, 1 Ob 571/86, JBl 1986, 713. Cf. OGH April 12, 2001, 8 ObA 98/00
w, SZ 74/65.
66. OGH April 12, 2001, supra note 65. See also P. Mazur, Odpowiedzialność przebijająca w prawie niemieckim, austriackim i szwajcarskim, IWS 49
(2017).
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Under American law, the mechanism of veil-piercing liability is
intended to prevent crime and promote equity in some specific factual situations.67 However, though there is a multitude of cases, state
and federal courts have not yet developed a uniform understanding
and a consistent case law on veil-piercing liability.68
In American law, the concept applies to both tort and contract
liability claims. However, a mere breach of contractual provisions
is insufficient to establish a basis for the application of veil-piercing
liability mechanisms.69
Despite the absence of a uniform definition of veil-piercing liability in American law, the judiciary has developed many theories
substantiating the concept under which, in certain circumstances,
members are liable towards their company’s creditors and, consequently, may be held accountable against such creditors for the company’s debts. Among the classical theories of veil-piercing liability,
one can distinguish the doctrine of instrumental treatment of a company (instrumentality doctrine), the alter ego doctrine and the identity doctrine.
In academic literature and judicial practice, the most widespread
theory allowing bypassing the corporate identity of a company is the
instrumentality doctrine, admissible in situations where a company
is a mere instrument in the hands of another entity.70 Once approved
by the courts in the State of New York, this doctrine became widely
used.71 The theory assumes the existence of three factors: entity exercising such control over a subsidiary that the subsidiary becomes
a tool in the hands of the controlling entity (mere instrumentality);
cases of fraud, injustice, unlawful behaviour or any other act

67. B. Jankowski, Nadużycie formy prawnej spółki w prawie amerykańskim,
2 PIP 70 (1996).
68. See also Davis v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 109 Idaho 810,
712 P.2d 511 (1985).
69. Zmysłowska, supra note 14 at 12.
70. M. Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. REV.
496 (1912), FLECHTER, supra note 32, at 167-195.
71. Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 76 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1936).
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prohibited by law; and a causal link between the act and the resulting
damage.72
The alter ego doctrine applies in situations where the convergence of interests between a member and the company is such that
the latter may be considered an “alter ego” of the member. On analysis, one cannot help but agree with the opinion that instrumentality
doctrine and alter ego doctrine amount to one and the same thing.73
Nevertheless, contrary views can also be found.74
Among the theories of veil-piercing liability, one should also
mention single factor theories (single factor piercing). This includes
the use of sham or shell corporations, use of the corporate form for
fraudulent, unjust or unlawful purposes, situations involving matters
regulated by federal law and the practice of presenting a group of
companies as a single business enterprise. These are referred to as
equitable theories because American courts apply them when the
collected evidence allows proving one of the factors indicated in the
classical compensatory liability theories. However, the case must involve a gross violation of the corporate form.75
These solutions differ from the regime of veil-piercing liability
as introduced in Italian law. The Italian Republic is a country where,
since 2004, legal provisions expressly set out the liability of a controlling company in relation to the creditors of its subsidiaries.76
4. Italy
Under the Italian legislative framework, companies or entities
which, in the course of management and coordination of other companies, act in their own interest or in the interest of a third party, in
violation of the principles of sound corporate management and business operations in relation to the companies subject to management
and coordination, incur direct liability to the members of such companies for damage arising from the lowering of the company’s
72. P.I. BLUMBERG, K. A. STRASSER, N.L. GEORGAKOPOULOS & E.J.
GOUVIN, BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS 11-3—11-4 (Wolters Kluwer, Supplement 2014-1).
73. Id., 11-01 to 11-04.
74. Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. V. Diners Club International, Inc.
802 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
75. See also Zmysłowska, supra note 14 at 23 et seq.
76. Art. 2497 et seq. of the Italian cod. civ., https://perma.cc/KJ2E-SEWE
(Last accessed: June 29, 2022).
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profitability and the value of shares or stocks held by such members,
and for the damage caused to creditors by compromising the company’s assets. However, liability does not arise when there is no actual damage in light of the totality of consequences of the management and coordination exercised, or when actual damage has been
redressed by subsequent actions undertaken as a part of the management or coordination exercise. Other persons incurring solidary liability alongside those previously identified, are the person or persons who participated in the commission of a harmful act and, within
the limits of the benefits obtained, the person or persons who knowingly reaped benefits from such act. Finally, members and creditors
of the coordinated company may sue the managing and coordinating
company or entity only as far as they have not been satisfied by the
company under the management and coordination exercise. This
legislative reform was to be based on two basic presumptions,
namely: transparency of relationships within a group (trasparenza)
and equilibrium of interests of the entities affected by the existence
of a corporate group (contemperamento degli interessi coinvolti).77
However, it must be remembered that, since the beginning of the
1990s,\the courts have not handled the problems of veil-piercing liability in Italian law.78
5. Poland
In Polish doctrine, no uniform definition of veil-piercing liability has been developed.79 Moreover, Polish law, in light of the mandatory nature of Art. 151 § 4 CCPC and Art. 301 § 5 CCPC, does
not offer an instrument of any description that would allow to exclude corporate separateness. In addition, no comprehensive regime
has been introduced that, following along the lines of the German
model, would govern the rights of corporate groups and provide a
basis for expanding the liability of a controlling entity. Provisions
77. See Moskała, supra note 33, at 32.
78. See for more details V. Cariello, The ‘Compensation’ of Damages with
Advantages Deriving from Management and Coordination Activity (Direzione e
Coordinamento) of the Parent Company (Article 2497, paragraph 1, Italian Civil
Code) – Italian Supreme Court 24 August 2004, no. 16707, 3 EUROPEAN COMPANY AND FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW 330 (2006).
79. See TARGOSZ, supra note 15 at 138; Wiórek, supra note 18 at 237.
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of the Code of Commercial Partnerships and Companies merely
contain rules defining the concepts of a controlling and subsidiary
company, imposing disclosure obligations on companies in relation
to the control relationship, and a number of provisions expanding
the legal regime governing a given parent company to its subsidiaries. Nevertheless, in the conditions of everyday Polish market practice, there are attempts to formulate claims based on the doctrine of
veil-piercing liability.
B. The Scope of Veil-Piercing Liability
To continue with the topic of the nature of veil-piercing liability,
it must be reminded that one of the traditionally important roles in
the structure of a limited liability company and joint-stock company
is the part played by their nominal capital. Both in Polish law and
legislations of other EU Member States, it is a foundation for the
operation of corporations.80 Under the current legislative framework, the construction of nominal capital requirements may be characterized as being both dysfunctional and inadequate regarding the
protection of creditors’ interests.
In response to the shortcomings of nominal capital, there are
voices in Polish literature that propose legislative reform or, more
radically, the abandonment of nominal capital and its replacement
by an alternative system based on a so-called solvency test.81 In the
German legal system, it was judicial practice that played an important role in the correction and supplementation of the construction of nominal capital, and existing jurisprudence was then taken
into consideration by the legislator.82 The amendments introduced,
which were a compromise, streamlined the operation of German

80. A. Radwan, Sens i nonsens kapitału zakładowego – przyczynek do
ekonomicznej analizy ustawowej ochrony wierzycieli spółek kapitałowych, in 2
EUROPEJSKIE PRAWO SPÓŁEK, INSTYTUCJE PRAWNE DYREKTYWY KAPITAŁOWEJ
59 (3rd ed., M. Cejmer, J. Napierała & T. Sójka eds., Zakamycze 2005).
81. See also K. Oplustil & P. Wiórek, Aktualne tendencje w europejskim
prawie spółek – orzecznictwo ETS i planowane działania prawodawcze, 5 PPH 4
(2004).
82. See also BGH “November”-Urteil BGH November 24, 2003, I ZR
171/01, BGHZ 157, 72-79; T. DRYGALA, M. STAAKE & P. SZALAI,
KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTSRECHT. MIT GRUNDZUGEN DES KONZERN- UND
UMWANDLUNGSRECHTS 114 (Springer 2012).
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limited liability companies and made them an attractive platform for
conducting business activity.
However, criticism of the protective function of nominal capital
questions its tenet and justifies the pursuit of alternative protection
of creditors.83 Still, regardless of the drawbacks of the discussed
construction, there are many situations in the laws of European
countries where the provisions implementing the guarantee function
of nominal capital do not apply.
Among such situations, one can mention the existence of undercapitalized companies,84 which lack the means to participate in business transactions, engage in the due management of funds or the
preparation of long-term financial plans considering their business
profile. Undercapitalization may be primary or subsequent, depending on whether from the outset the company had not been equipped
with a capital base sufficient to meet the scope of its operation, or if
the capital was subject to certain reduction in the course of the company’s business. Undercapitalization may also be divided into nominal (nominelle Unterkapitalisierung)85 and substantive (materielle
Unterkapitalisierung).86 That said, in the case of undercapitalization, the legitimacy of asserting claims directly against members,
although commonly supported in the doctrine, has not been accepted
by German courts.87
Another problem is to determine which of the assets are the
property of a company and which are the property of a member; a
dilemma posing a threat to the principle of separateness. A peculiar
“confusion” of patrimonies arises when a member of a limited liability company conducts matters of the company as his own business, treating the company’s assets as part of his own patrimony, or
keeps accounts in a non-transparent or unreliable manner.88
83. Act of July 13, 2006 on the protection of employee claims in case of employer’s insolvency (Dz.U. 2006 no. 158 poz. 1121).
84. See also Opalski, supra note 16, at 17-18.
85. T.
ECKHOLD,
MATERIELLE
UNTERKAPITALISIERUNG.
ZUR
GESELLSCHAFTERVERANTWORTLICHKEIT IN DER GESELLSCHAFT MIT
BESCHRÄNKTER HAFTUNG 8 (Heymanns 2002); WIÓREK, supra note 42, at 53-54.
86. Id. at 9; WIÓREK, supra note 42, at 54.
87. BGH April 28, 2008, II ZR 264/06, NJW 2008, 2437.
88. K. WAPPLER, DIE HAFTUNG VON GESELLSCHAFTERN EINER GMBH AUF
GRUND VON EINFLUSSNAHMEN AUF DIE LEITUNG DER GESELLSCHAFT. VOM
QUALIFIZIERT FAKTISCHEN KONZERN ÜBER DURCHGRIFFSHAFTUNG WEGEN
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Undoubtedly, such behaviour may harm the creditors’ interests and
this is why, both in doctrine and in jurisprudence, it creates an indisputable situation that renders the application of veil-piercing liability admissible. On such occasions, the legal basis is § 128 HGB. A
similar situation is the failure to scrupulously maintain the company’s documentation, which repeatedly precludes identification
and elimination of the negative influence exerted by a member regarding the financial situation and operations of a limited liability
company.89 On the other hand, a company’s failure to keep proper
accounts departs from the principle of nominal capital protection (§
30 GmbHG).
The need to separate the patrimonies belonging to the company
and to its members is accentuated in the judicial practice of the Federal Court of Justice. For example, in its judgement of November
12, 1984,90 it was held that clear and substantiated separation of the
company’s assets from the assets of its stockholders, in accounting
entries and financial documents, is one of the necessary conditions
for affording company members the privilege of limiting their liability for the company’s debts. Similar conclusions can be reached
upon analysis of the decision of the Federal Court of Justice of October 14, 2005, which allowed the concept of veil-piercing liability
to be applied because the relevant company kept non-transparent accounts, thus precluding the review of compliance with the provisions on nominal capital. Actual coverage of the nominal capital was
found necessary for the limitation of liability of the company’s
members. At the same time, the Federal Court of Justice concluded
that the liability of members is a derivative of their behaviour
(Verhaltenshaftung) and not a consequence of a specific state of affairs (Zustandshaftung).91
Among other situations posing a threat to a company’s creditors,
one can point to the loss of financial liquidity, the deprivation of
assets necessary to conduct business activity, the transfer of assets
EXISTENZVERNICHTUNG ZUR DELIKTRECHTLICHEN HAFTUNG GEM. § 826 BGB
262 (Nomos 2010).
89. Id. at 276.
90. The Federal Court of Justice also emphasized that the provisions on the
maintenance of capital, intended to protect the interests of corporate creditors, are
based on a clear distinction between the company’s assets and personal assets of
company members. See BGH November 12, 1984, II ZR 250/83, NJW 1985, 740.
91. BGH October 14, 2005, II ZR 178/03, NJW 2006, 1344.

122

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 14

contrary to trading principles, situations related to securing the
members’ interests (their receivables) and engaging in high-risk
transactions.
Another problem that recently aroused much controversy in the
judicial practice of the Federal Court of Justice, was liability for the
members’ actions leading to termination of the company (Existenzvernichtung). Such possibility was admitted for the first time
in a judgement of 2001.92 However, this line of jurisprudence was
abandoned by the Federal Court of Justice six years later.93 The relevant ruling excluded the possibility of veil-piercing liability where
a member undertook actions that could lead to termination of a corporation. Indeed, the Court pointed to the possibility, open for the
company and its creditors, to file claims in damages against the
members who took such actions based on delictual or tort liability
(§ 826 BGB94).
The Austrian Supreme Court, in a judgement of 2004,95 making
reference to German doctrine, ruled that it was generally possible to
hold members liable for the company’s debts by means of teleological reduction of the provisions granting members the privilege of
limited liability (§ 61(2) öGmbHG and § 48 öAktG). The Court
found that the doctrine of veil-piercing liability may be applied in
four situations. First, excluding the limitation of a member’s liability
for the company’s debts would be possible if the company is an alter
ego of the member. This is the case when the member exercises de
facto management of the company’s operations, acting as a member
of the management board. Second, as in the German legal system,
imposition on a member of liability for the company’s debts was
admitted in case of confusion of the patrimonies of the company and
its members (Sphärenvermischung). Third, the corporate veil could
be pierced in case of an abuse, on the part of a member, of the corporate form (missbrauch der Organisationsfreiheit). Fourth and finally, it was considered admissible to charge members with veil-

92. See BGH June 17, 2001, II ZR 178/99, DNOTI-REPORT 2001, 182.
93. BGH Juy 16, 2007, II ZR 3/04, IBRRS 2007, 3886.
94. Bürgeliche Gesetzbuch (BGBI. I S. 42, ber. S. 2909, ber. 2003 I S. 738),
https://perma.cc/HM7V-GC5P (Last accessed: June 30, 2022).
95. OGH April 29, 2004, 6 Ob 313/03 B, GeS 2005/1.

2021-2022]

VEIL-PIERCING LIABILITY

123

piercing liability for the company’s debts in case of substantive undercapitalization of the company (materielle Unterkapitalisierung).
The Italian legislator recognized the need for a special protection
to be afforded to creditors of subsidiary companies participating in
holding structures.96 However, this did not lead to the enactment of
norms introducing direct personal liability of the controlling company for debts of its subsidiaries, which would be an exception to
the principle of a member’s non-liability for corporate debts.
In Italian law, the burden of proof is with minority stockholders
and creditors of the company, who should demonstrate that (1) a
specific act of management violated the terms of proper management; (2) the controlling entity acted in its own interest or in the
economic interest of third parties; (3) the company’s income or the
value of its shares have decreased and, that as a consequence of the
actions undertaken, damage was caused to their assets.9799 The solutions introduced in Italian holding law are to protect the interests of
creditors of subsidiary companies by affording them a claim against
the controlling company for the recovery of damages. A circumstance found to justify the liability of the controlling entity towards
creditors of subsidiary companies was the management of the subsidiary and coordination of the subsidiary’s activities by the controlling company.98 It follows that the limitation of autonomy of a subsidiary company by the controlling company should give rise to special liability of the controlling entity which makes decisions and
gives instructions relating to the daughter company. However, such
a solution also protects the position of the parent company, as its
liability may only materialize when some specific conditions are
met. Nonetheless, because of the mechanisms enabling the controlling company to be discharged of liability to the creditors of subsidiary companies, coupled with the lack of means to relax the burden

96. K. PYZIO, ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚĆ SPÓŁKI DOMINUJĄCEJ WZGLĘDEM
WIERZYCIELI KAPITAŁOWYCH SPÓŁEK ZALEŻNYCH s. 23-24, (C.H. Beck 2015); R.
Truffi & S. Straneo, Groups of Companies Under the New Italian Company Law,
JONES DAY COMMENTARIES 1 (March 2004).
97. Art. 2359 (2) Italian Civ. Code; PYZIO, supra note 96 at s. 23-24.
98. A. Daccò & T. Tatozzi, in COMMENTARIO BREVE AL CODICE CIVILE 3099
(10th ed., G. Cian & A. Trabucchi eds., Cedam 2011); G. Alessi, L’azione di
responsabilità nei gruppi di imprese, in SOCIETÀ. IL DIZIONARIO DELLA RIFORMA
392 (M. de Tilla, G. Alpa & S. Patti eds., 2003).
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of proof creditors are required to provide, this solution is understandably subject to criticism in Italian literature.99
IV. CRITICISM OF THE CONCEPT OF VEIL-PIERCING LIABILITY
Although the literature reveals shortcomings in the protection of
creditors due to the existence of gaps in legislative protection, voices
can be heard questioning judicial developments trying to fill those
gaps. Certain authors deploy methodological100 or constitutional101
arguments. Others criticize the doctrine of veil-piercing liability on
a dogmatic level, with two lines of arguments: first, a general dogmatic criticism that does not refer to the methodological legitimacy
and the need for developing the piercing concept, and second, a general dogmatic criticism recognizing the need for judicial law-making albeit to the exclusion of veil-piercing liability.
As far as the methodological criticism of veil-piercing liability
is concerned, its precursor was U. Ehricke.102 The author points to
the chaos and uncertainty caused by the veil-piercing liability theory. Moving beyond dogmatic and factual levels, he shifted the discourse to the most important level, that of methodology.
First, one wonders whether, from a methodological perspective,
the piercing concept is necessary. Second, upon determination of the
methodological admissibility of legal veil-piercing liability, one
may search to justify the obligation of company members to incur
liability for their company’s debts. On the dogmatic level, one may
consider a limitation to the exclusion of member liability for the
company’s debts in case of malpractice and abuse of the corporate
construction and the need to expand liability for the company’s
debts to its members. Lastly, on the level of facts, one should consider specific situations which substantiate the use of the piercing
construction.103
99. Truffi & Straneo, supra note 96 at s. 1; Daccò & Tatozzi, supra note 98
at s.3099; G. Alessi, supra note 98 at s. 392.
100. U. Ehricke, Zur Begründbarkeit der Durchgriffshaftung in der GmbH,
insbesondere aus methodischer Sicht, 199 ACP 225 (1999).
101. W. Nassall, Der existenzvernichtende Eingriff in die GmbH:
Einwendungen aus verfassungs- und insolvenzrechtlicher Sicht, ZIP 969 (2003).
102. H.C.
GRIGOLEIT,
GESELLSCHAFTERHAFTUNG
FÜR
INTERNE
EINFLUSSNAHME IM RECHT DER GMBH, (C.H. Beck 2006).
103. Ehricke, supra note 100, at 262.

2021-2022]

VEIL-PIERCING LIABILITY

125

Other authors criticize the concept of veil-piercing liability from
the methodological and constitutional perspective. W. Nassall, when
criticizing a decision of the Federal Court of Justice, concluded that
the Court supplemented, in an unjustified manner, the provision excluding liability of company members for their company’s debts.104
In the opinion of the Court, this rule will not apply if members deprive the company of its assets or consent to an intervention or if the
damage so inflicted to the company may not be entirely remedied or
if the company, as a result of an intervention, has lost its capacity to
pay debts. In Nassall’s opinion, in such situations, there is no need
nor ground for any judicial development of the law. Indeed, such
legal developments do require careful and constitutional justification and can only take place when overall, the law appears to be
incomplete as initially planned or subsequently amended.105 There
are no sufficient arguments to conclude that there is a legislative gap
to be filled since the system of nominal capital was intended to, and
to some extent does, afford sufficient protection to creditors.
To go further, veil-piercing liability places emphasis on insolvency law rather than company law because it refers to the loss by a
company of its capacity to pay debts. If so, the remedies should be
sought in the provisions of insolvency law. The protective mechanism in insolvency law is composed of two basic elements: liquidation and restructuring. The first obligates managers to file for bankruptcy within a specific deadline calculated from the date of emergence of the grounds for bankruptcy, i.e. insolvency or indebtedness. On the other hand, the restructuring aspect relates to the possibility of contesting the acts of the insolvent debtor and the managers’ obligation to return any payments from the company’s assets,
which were made after the emergence of grounds for bankruptcy.
Further, criticism of the piercing concept on the dogmatic level
is voiced by J. Wilhelm, who questions the grounds for distinguishing proper and improper theories of veil-piercing liability.106 The
author claims that veil-piercing liability has no precise boundaries
or grounds backing up its support by judicial opinions. At the same
104. Nassall, supra note 100, at 970.
105. Id. at 971.
106. J. WILHELM, RECHTSFORM UND HAFTUNG BEI DER JURISTISCHEN PERSON
310-314 (Heymann 1981).
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time, he recognized the risk of legally ungrounded and equitable resolutions being assigned the force of a legal principle based on completely arbitrary argumentation. Theories of abuse, institutional theories and theories involving a norm’s purpose, refer to objective criteria whose ascertainment is problematic even for proponents of
such theories. In addition, conceptions of a norm’s purpose reach
beyond the application of existing rules and move on to the level of
legal policy or de lege ferenda comments. In Wilhelm’s opinion,
those conceptions may indicate that the remedies intended to protect
creditors are insufficient, however, they allow for actions that are
not supported by legislative provisions.107
Others, recognizing the shortcomings of nominal capital, signal
the need for judicial development of law by creating concepts other
than veil-piercing liability, which could enhance the scope and effectiveness of creditor protection. One such possibility is to associate company members’ liability with the principle of dispositional
freedom of such members and its boundaries. This is the case since
the provisions on contributing and maintaining nominal capital
specify situations in which members of a limited liability company
are liable to the company. In particular, they incur compensatory
liability for overstatement of the value of non-monetary contributions (§ 9 GmbHG, c.f. Art. 175 CCPC) and in the case of receipt
of payments constituting the return of the entirety or part of their
contribution, or payments from the company’s assets needed to fully
cover the nominal capital (§ 30 et seq GmbHG, c.f. Art. 198 in conjunction with Art. 189 CCPC). As a consequence, provisions specifying the scope of members’ leeway in the management of the company and disposal of the company’s assets set the boundaries of their
accountability for internal influence on the company (gesellschaftsinterne Einflussnahme der Gesellschafter). As long as company members do not overstep their discretion, they are not liable to
the company.

107.

Id. at 314.
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V. CONCLUSION
The problems with seeking the liability of company members
using the concept of veil-piercing liability—considering the solutions developed in several legal systems—should be assessed as heterogeneous and multithreaded. Even in German or American doctrine,108 where the theories justifying such a liability have been extensively discussed and developed, there is no uniform and consistent concept of veil-piercing liability, both on the theoretical and
methodological level.
On the other hand, the principle of corporate separateness, which
has such rigid foundations from the axiological and normative perspective, may be limited to achieve greater creditor protection.
Nevertheless, the undertaken analyses allow the establishment
of preconditions justifying the use of the discussed concept and the
depiction of the basic theories that substantiate veil-piercing liability. These include the objective abuse theory (theory of institutional
abuse) and the theory of teleological reduction, which was also
based on objective criteria. However, developing veil-piercing liability based on objective criteria, as a mechanism intended to prevent gross abuses of the legal corporate form, gave it a character of
absolute liability. In consequence, it is for the courts to assess the
extent of abuse of the corporate entity, thus depriving members of
the possibility to escape liability by proving that they had not been
guilty of the abuse. Such views give rise to criticism of the construction of veil-piercing liability and to its mitigation by bringing it
closer to compensatory liability.
At the same time, in the German, Austrian, and Swiss legal systems, one can identify tendencies to replace veil-piercing liability
with mechanisms assuming that company members are liable for
their own acts. Such a liability may be based on general terms or
108. M.J. Gaertner, Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Corporation
Owners Have It Both Ways?, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 667 (1989); L. Fastrich,
A. Baumbach & A. Hueck, in L. MICHALSKI, A. HEIDINGER ET AL., KOMMENTAR
ZUM GESETZ BETREFFEND DIE GESELLSCHAFTEN MIT BESCHRÄNKTER HAFTUNG
(GMBH-GESETZ), komentarz do § 13 ust. 2 GmbHG, no. 5 &335 (3rd ed., C.H.
Beck 2017); H. G. Bamberger & H. Roth, Beck'scher Online-Kommentar
GmbHG, komentarz do § 13 GmbHG, no. 55 Beck-online (2017); H. MERKT, H.
FLEISCHER ET AL., MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ BETREFFEND DIE
GESELLSCHAFTEN MIT BESCHRÄNKTER HAFTUNG (GMBHG), komentarz do § 13
GmbHG, no.332. (3rd ed., C.H. Beck 2015).
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consist in the imposition on the controlling company of specific duties stemming from the influence the parent entity may have on the
decisions of a daughter company. At English law, where the discussed concept was not met with wide approval, it is admitted that
in some cases, a controlling company may be held liable to the creditors of its subsidiary.
Criticism of the veil-piercing liability concept in German doctrine and jurisprudence is much more extensive and multifaceted
when compared to the corresponding criticism of the concept and
construction of abuse of the legal corporate form in the Polish legal
system. Indeed, Polish doctrine has not developed a concept of
abuse of the legal corporate form leading to consequences similar to
the German Durchgriffshaftung, especially providing for the consequence of piercing.
More importantly, from a comparative law perspective, it would
be impossible to conclude that the Polish legal system offers a wider
and more comprehensive system of creditor protection, which justifies a rare application of the piercing concept or its exclusion. It must
be remembered that the remedies envisaged in Art. 299 CCPC109 are
known also in other legal systems, which does not preclude the application of veil-piercing liability or alternative grounds of company
members’ liability.
109. Under art. 299 CCPC,
§ 1. [i]f execution against the company proves ineffective, members of
the management board shall be solidarily liable for the company's liabilities.
§ 2. A member of the management board may be discharged from liability referred to in § 1 above if he proves that the petition in bankruptcy was timely filed or, at the same time, decision was delivered on
the commencement of a restructuring procedure or approving a composition in a procedure for the approval of a composition, or that a failure to file the petition in bankruptcy occurred through no fault on his
part, or that despite the failure to file the petition or non-delivery of a
decision commencing a restructuring procedure or non-approval of a
composition in a procedure for the approval of a composition, the creditor suffered no damage.
§ 3. The provisions of § 1 and 2 above shall not prejudice the provisions
whereby further liability of members of the management board is envisaged.
§ 4. The persons specified in § 1 shall not be liable for a failure to file
the petition for bankruptcy in the course of execution by administrative
receivership or through sale of an enterprise, under the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure, if the obligation to file the petition for
bankruptcy arose during the execution.
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From this, it must be concluded that an acceptable and legitimate
solution for creditors of a subsidiary company would be to seek
compensatory liability against the controlling company based on the
general law. In its judgement of 24 November 2009,110 the Polish
Supreme Court expressed the opinion that there are no grounds for
exclusion of direct and personal liability of a member of a limited
liability company for damages caused to third parties. However, in
the opinion of the Court, the company member always holds personal liability for his own culpable behaviours causing damage to
third parties but is not personally liable for the company’s debts.
In the relationship between a company and its member (the controlling corporation), the compensatory liability of the latter may
materialize as a consequence of such member’s violation of the loyalty obligation. Such a duty is generated by the obligational relationship it has with the company.111 Its violation may give rise to contractual liability (Art. 471 et seq. of the Civil Code).112 However, the
only currently available legislative basis113 for claims by creditors
of a subsidiary against the controlling company—as a member of
the subsidiary—is the regime of delictual liability.114 If the controlling member acts to the detriment of creditors of the subsidiary, this
may allow these creditors to sue the controlling member in compensatory damages. On such occasions, the damage may be a detriment
suffered by the subsidiary’s creditor in consequence of non-performance of the subsidiary’s obligations.115 Of course, all conditions of
delictual liability must be met.
When considering the Skanska judgment of the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU)116, it is a justifiable conclusion that
the court accepted veil-piercing liability within the private law realm
of competition law, because it was allowed to direct claims against
110. Supreme Court, November 24, 2009, V CSK 169/09, LEX 627248.
111. D. WAJDA, OBOWIĄZEK LOJALNOŚCI W SPÓŁKACH HANDLOWYCH 132
(C.H. Beck 2009).
112. S. WŁODYKA, PRAWO KONCERNOWE 176 (Zakamycze 2003).
113. P. Wąż, Cywilnoprawna odpowiedzialność uczestników koncernu, 4
PRAWO SPÓŁEK 12 (2008).
114. T. Targosz, Odpowiedzialność wspólnika wobec wierzycieli spółki, 4
PRZEGLĄD PRAWA HANDLOWEGO 27 (2003), WŁODYKA, supra note 112, at
1572.
115. WŁODYKA, supra note 112, at 1573.
116. C-724/17, Court of Justice of the European Union, March 14, 2019,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:204.
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entities who, according to national laws, are separate persons, independent of the entity that caused damage. It seems, however, that
another explanation is also admissible, namely that the CJEU, by
accepting the liability of an enterprise, did not refer to the notion of
veil-piercing liability, but rather concentrated on the concept of the
enterprise and concluded that the liable party is one enterprise,
which is composed of various entities.

